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On June 29, 2006, the Supreme Court by a 5-3 vote in Ham-
dan v. RumsfeM set aside President Bush's November 13, 2001 
order2 providing for trial by military commission of non-citizens 
believed to be associated with the al Qaeda terrorist organiza-
tion and apprehended during the conflict in Afghanistan and be-
ing held in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. In an opinion authored by 
Justice Stevens, the Court held that President Bush lacked con-
gressional authorization to provide for the trial of these Guan-
tanamo detainees by military commission and that some of the 
procedures contemplated for these trials contravened the Uni-
form Code of Military Justice ("UCMJ").3 Heralded by many 
academic observers as a signal victory for the "Rule of Law" and 
human rights even in wartime, Hamdan requires the President to 
try the Guantanamo detainees by court-martial proceedings or 
to seek from Congress express authorization of the use of mili-
tary commissions falling short of court-martial procedures. Now, 
less than one year after the Court's decision, Congress has pro-
vided such authorization in the Military Commissions Act of 
2006 ("MCA").4 Before discussing the MCA, we begin with an 
examination of the limits of the Court's holding in Hamdan . 
* Dwight D. Opperman Professor of Law and Co-Director, Opperman Institute 
of Judicial Administration, New York University School of Law. 
** Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. An earlier version of this 
Article, written before enactment of the MCA and without footnotes, appeared in 9 The 
Green Bag 2d 353 (2006). The comments of Laurence Gold are gratefully acknowledged; 
any remaining errors are our own. 
1. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2(XJ6). 
2. Military Order of November 13, 2001, 66 Fed. Rcg.57833-36 (Nov. 16, 2001) 
[hereinafter November 13 Order). 
3. 10 U.SC. § 801, ch. 47 (2000). 
4. Pub. L. 109-366, signed by President Bush into law on October 17,2006. 
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I. THE LIMITS OF HAMDAN V. RUMSFELD 
Hamdan is a remarkable ruling. Use of military commis-
sions during wartime to try military personnel or enemy combat-
ants considered to have violated the laws of war has a long his-
tory, dating back to the Mexican War5 and in some accounts to 
the Revolutionary War.6 To our knowledge, the Court had not 
previously placed curbs on the President's ability to try sus-
pected unlawful combatants by military commission. Ex parte 
Milligan was, of course, a case involving "a citizen in civil life, in 
nowise connected with the military service .... "7 The decisions 
from the World War II era, especially Ex parte Quirin8 and In re 
Yamashita, 9 pointed in one direction10 -that existing Articles of 
War legislation had authorized military commissions as an exer-
cise of the President's common law military power, and that 
courts-martial provided a concurrent means for trying war 
criminals that did not alter the traditional role for military com-
• • 11 
miSSIOnS. 
5. David Glazier of the University of Virginia's Center for National Security Law 
reports that General Winfield Scott, the U.S. Army's commander during the Mexican 
War of 1846-48, "established a separate tribunal ... called Councils of War for trying law 
of war violations that would be known as 'war crimes' today." David Glazier, Precedents 
Lost: The Neglected History of the Military Commission, 46 VA. J. 1:-iT'L L. 5, 36 (2005). 
The Hamdan Court seemingly agrees that the military "commission 'as such' was inaugu-
rated in 1847." 126 S. Ct. at 2773 (citing WILLIAM WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW ASD 
PRECEDENTS 832 (rev.2d ed.1920); G. DAVIS, A TREATISE ON THE MILITARY LAW OF 
THE UNITED STATES 308 (2d ed. 1909)). 
6. The Court noted that the military commission was "foreshadowed in some re-
spects by earlier tribunals like the Board of General Officers that General Washington 
convened to try British Major John Andre for spying during the Revolutionary War. ... " 
126 S. Ct. at 2773. Andre had been captured in civilian clothes behind enemy lines carry-
ing documents from Benedict Arnold; Washington's panel reported that he "ought to be 
considered as a spy from the enemy and ... agreeable to the Law and usage of na-
tions ... he ought to suffer death." Proceedings of A Board of General Officers Respect-
ing Major John Andre 79, Sept. 29,1780 (Francis Bailey ed. 1780). Glazier discounts this 
precedent, arguing that the Andre panel was not a military court with power of execution 
but merely rendered an advisory opinion to General Washington; and that, in any event, 
courts-martial were used for the vast majority of accused British spies during the Revolu-
tion. See Glazier, supra note 5, at 18-23. 
7. Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 121-22 (1866). 
8. Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942). For a very interesting account of Justice 
Jackson's views, see Jack Goldsmith, Justice Jackson's Unpublished Opinion in Ex parte 
Quirin, 9 The Green Bag 2d 223 (2006). 
9. In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946). 
10. The Court in Hamdan recognized that the "law-of-war military commission" 
was used during World War II, that the Court had "sanctioned President Roosevelt's usc 
of such a tribunal to try Nazi saboteurs captured on "American soil during the War," 126 
S. Ct. at 2776 (citing Quirin), and that "we held that a military commission had jurisdic-
tion to try a Japanese commander for failing to prevent troops under his command from 
committing atrocities in the Philippines." I d. (citing Yamashita). 
11. For the Hamdan Court, "Quirin represents the high-water mark of military 
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Congress codified the Articles of War by enacting the 
UCMJ in 195012 but it made no changes in the Articles dealing 
with military commissions or the procedures governing them. It 
did provide in Article 36(b) that the President's rules and regula-
tions prescribing procedure "in cases before courts-martial, 
courts of inquiry, military commissions, and other military tribu-
nals ... shall be uniform insofar as practicable and shall be re-
ported to Congress." 13 Despite contrary World War II prece-
dent,14 the Hamdan Court seized on this seemingly modest 
provision, the implications of which for military commissions oc-
casioned no discussion in the relevant committee reports,15 as es-
tablishing a "uniformity principle" contravened by Hamdan's 
military commission. 
With the benefit of hindsight, the President might have 
done a better job framing the issue for the courts. It was natu-
rally difficult to convince the Justices of a military exigency re-
power to try enemy combatants for war crimes." 126 S. Ct. at 2777. The Quirin Court 
stated that the Articles of War, 10 U.S. C.§§ 1471-1593, "recognize the 'military commis-
sion' appointed by military command as an appropriate tribunal for the trial and punish-
ment of offenses against the law of war not ordinarily tried by court martial." 317 U.S. at 
12. In Yamashita, the Court read Quirin as holding that "Congress gave sanction ... to 
any use of the military commission contemplated by the common law of war." 327 U.S. at 
20. This reading was reaffirmed in Madsen v. Kinsella, 343 U.S. 341, 355 (1952). 
12. Uniform Code of Military Justice, Pub. L. No. 81-506, 64 Stat. 107 (1950). 
13. 10 U .S.C.§ 836 (2000). 
14. The Court in Yamashita had sustained a military commission proceeding that 
did not follow court-martial procedures. Because the accused Japanese commander in 
that case was not subject to the Articles of War by virtue of Article 2, "the military com-
mission before which he was tried, though sanctioned, and its jurisdiction saved by Arti-
cle 15, was not convened by virtue of the Articles of War, but pursuant to the common 
law of war .... The Articles left the control over the procedure in such a case where it 
had previously been, with the military command." 327 U.S. at 20. However, since "the 
UMO's codification of the Articles of War after World War II expanded the category of 
persons subject thereto to include defendants in Yamashita's (and Hamdan's) position, 
and the Third Geneva Convention of 1949, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, T.I.A.S. No. 
3364, extended prisoner-of-war status to individuals tried for crimes committed prior to 
their capture, the Hamdan Court reasoned that Yamashita, "[t]he most notorious excep-
tion to the principle of uniformity, ... has been stripped of its precedential value." 126 S. 
Ct. at 2789-90. 
15. Referring to Justice Thomas's dissenting view that the adoption of Article 36(b) 
was motivated solely by a desire to promote uniformity of procedure across the separate 
branches of the armed services, without including military commissions, the Hamdan 
Court noted that "even if Congress were concerned with ensuring uniformity across ser-
vice branches, that does not mean it did not also intend to codify the longstanding prac-
tice of procedural parity between courts-martial and other military tribunals." 126 S. Ct. 
at 2791 n.50. But see Eugene R. Fidell, Dwight H. Sullivan & Detlev F. Vagts, Military 
Commission Law, The Army Lawyer, pp. 47-48 (Dec. 2005): "One might argue that this 
uniformity clause [in Article 36(b) J implies that the rules and regulations must, 'insofar as 
practicable,' be uniform as between courts-martial, military commissions, and other mili-
tary tribunals (such as provost courts), but the better reading is that the uniformity re-
ferred to is uniformity among the various armed forces." 
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quiring trial by military commission when Hamdan, reputed to 
have been Osama Bin Laden's driver in Afghanistan, was turned 
over to the U.S. military in November 2001, transported to 
Guantanamo Bay in June 2002, deemed triable by military 
commission for unspecified offenses in July 2003, and, only after 
he had brought suit seeking his release, was charged on July 13, 
2004 with one count of conspiracy "to commit ... offenses tri-
able by military commission." 16 More work also could have been 
done to consult with Congress so that the Justices might have 
been less inclined to view the President's November 13 Order as 
grounded in bald claims of inherent executive power rather than 
reflecting the exercise of a shared responsibility between the two 
branches. 
Even so, Congress was plainly aware of the President's Or-
der and even after Hamdan's commission had been named, it 
enacted the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 ("DTA"). 17 The 
DT A provides for restrictions on the treatment and interroga-
tion of the Guantanamo detainees, requires the Secretary of De-
fense to report to Congress on the procedures used to determine 
the proper classification of these detainees, and establishes the 
exclusive jurisdiction of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. 
Circuit to review both classification determinations and final de-
cisions of military commissions convened to try the detainees. 
There is a strong argument that the DT A provided sufficient au-
thorization for the President's Order, particularly in light of the 
long history of the use of military commissions in wartime. Jus-
tice Jackson's observation, concurring in the Steel Seizure case,18 
would have seemed particularly apt: "When the President acts 
pursuant to an express or implied authorization of Congress, his 
authority is at its maximum, for it includes all that he Rossesses 
in his own right plus all that Congress can delegate." Indeed, 
the Government argued that the DT A both authorized the 
commissions and limited the Court's jurisdiction to entertain 
Hamdan's writ when his trial before the commission had not yet 
begun. 
The Court, however, was of a different view. Not only did it 
find no bar to its jurisdiction in the DTA, it also held the DTA 
16. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2759. 
17. Pub.L. No. 109-148, Div. A, Tit. X, 119 Stat. 2739,2680 (signed into law on De-
cember 30, 2005). 
18. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579,634 (1952) (Jackson, J., 
concurring). 
19. /d. at 635. 
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to be insufficiently "specific congressional authorization" for 
Hamdan's military commission.20 The DT A, we are told, "con-
tains no language authorizing [Hamdan's] tribunal or any other 
at Guantanamo Bay";21 '"recognizes' the existence of the Guan-
tanamo Bay commissions in the weakest sense" of merely "ref-
erenc[ing] some of the military orders governing them and 
creat[ing] limited judicial review of their 'final decision(s )"';22 
and, at most, "acknowledge[ s] a general Presidential authority to 
convene military commissions in circumstances where justified 
under the 'Constitution and laws,' including the law of war."23 No 
authority was given for the Court's rather demanding "clear 
statement" requirement-that Congress, in essence, must state 
affirmatively, "we authorize" or "we approve" the use of mili-
tary commissions for the particular conflict (and presumably 
with the particular procedures specified by the President). 
Justice Stevens' opinion has six substantive parts, all of 
which were joined by Justices Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer. Jus-
tice Kennedy provided a key fifth vote, joining Justice Stevens's 
opinion in all but Parts V and VI-D-iv. 2 For ease of exposition, 
we set out the structure of Justice Stevens' opinion, as follows: 
• Part II. The Court denied the Government's request to 
dismiss for lack of jurisdiction based on the DT A. 
• Part III. The Court declined to abstain and await the out-
come of ongoing military proceedings in Hamdan's case. 
• Part IV. The Court rejected the Government's argument 
that the DTA and Congress's 2001 Authorization for Use 
of Military Force ("AUMF") "to prevent any future acts 
of international terrorism against the United States"25 
provided sufficient authorization for the President's use 
of military commissions to try Guantanamo detainees (at 
least pursuant to the procedures specified by the Presi-
dent). 
• Part V. After discussing the circumstances in which mili-
tary commissions have been convened in the past, a plu-
rality of the Court stated that the conspiracy charge lev-
20. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2775 
21. /d. 
22. !d. 
23. /d. 
24. The Chief Justice recused himself from the case because he sat on the panel that 
considered Hamdan's appeal in the D.C. Circuit. Justice Kennedy's vote was key because 
a 4-4 vote would have affirmed the judgment of the D.C. Circuit below. 
25. 115 Stat. 224, note following 50 U.S C. § 1541 (2000 ed., Supp. III). 
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eled against Hamdan does not state a violation of the 
"law of war" (which delimits the jurisdiction of military 
commissions under Article 21 of the UCMJ26). 
• Part VI. The Court held that Hamdan's military commis-
sion lacked the power to proceed because "the proce-
dures' admitted deviation from those governin$ courts-
martial itself renders the commission illegal."2 Several 
bases were given: 
• The Court read Article 36 of the UCMJ to establish 
a "uniformity principle," requiring court-martial 
rules to apply to military commissions, at least ab-
sent a Presidential determination that it is "imprac-
ticable" to do so. Here, the order establishing Ham-
dan's military commission permits exclusion of the 
accused from the proceeding, whereas the UCMJ 
normall¥ requires a trial "in the presence of the ac-
cused."2 Such variance from court-martial proce-
dures was not saved by a Presidential determination 
of impracticability; nor did the record indicate that it 
would be impractical in this case to apply the rules 
used in courts-martial. (Part VI-C) 
• Hamdan's military commission contravened Com-
mon Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, 
which was deemed implicitly incorporated in the 
UCMJ's authorization of military commissions for 
offenses in violations of the "law of war." Common 
Article 3 applies to the conflict with al Qaeda, which 
is considered a "conflict not of an international 
character" because it is not a conflict between states 
but, rather, between the United States and non-state 
groups occurring in the territory of a contracting 
power (i.e., Afghanistan).29 Common Article 3 re-
quires use of a "regularly constituted court" to try 
26. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2778-86. 
27. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2787 (noting Hamdan's position). 
28. See id. at 2792: "The absence of any showing of impracticability is particularly 
disturbing when considered in light of the clear and admitted failure to apply one of the 
most fundamental protections afforded not just by the Manual for Courts-Martial but 
also by the UCMJ itself the right to be present. See 10 U.S.C.A. § 839(c) (Supp.2006)." 
29. But see International Comm. of the Red Cross ("ICRC"), Commentary to the 
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War 37 (Jean Pictet ed. 
1960) ("Speaking generally, it must be recognized that the conl1icts referred to in Article 
3 are armed conl1icts, ... which are in many respects similar to an international war, but 
take place within the confines of a single country."). 
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Hamdan; and Hamdan's military commission is not 
such a court. 30 "At a minimum, a military commis-
sion 'can be "regularly constituted" by the standards 
of our military justice system only if some practical 
need explains deviation from court-martial practice.' 
As we have explained, no such need has been dem-
onstrated here."31 (Part VI-D-i through iii) 
• The plurality maintained that the procedures con-
templated for Hamdan's commission violate both 
Common Article 3 and "customary international 
law" principles embodied in Article 75 of Protocol I 
to the Geneva Conventions of 1949-most notably, 
in failing to guarantee that "an accused must, absent 
disruptive conduct or consent, be present for his trial 
and must be privy to the evidence against him." 32 
(Part VI-D-iv) 
It is clear from the foregoing that a majority of the Court 
agreed that (1) it had jurisdiction to hear Hamdan's case not-
withstanding the judicial review provisions of the DTA; (2) ab-
stention was not appropriate in this case; (3) neither the DTA 
nor the AUMF provided sufficient authorization for the Presi-
dent's order establishing use of military commissions for the 
Guantanomo detainees, at least pursuant to the procedures 
therein contemplated; ( 4) such commissions were subject to the 
"uniformity principle" established by the UCMJ, requiring use 
of court-martial procedures at least absent a Presidential finding 
of impracticability, not made here; and (5) the contemplated 
procedures were at variance with certain court-martial proce-
dures and with Common Article 3's requirement of a "regularly 
constituted court." 
30. The Hamdan Coun allowed that "the term 'regularly constituted court' is not 
specifically defined in either Common Anicle 3 or its accompanying commentary," but 
for "its core meaning" relied, inter alia, on commentary to the Fourth Geneva Conven-
tion that "defines 'regularly constituted' tribunals to include ordinary military courts' and 
'definitely exclude(s) all special tribunals.' [ICRC, Commentary, IV Geneva Convention 
Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War 340 (Jean S. Pictet ed. 
1958)] (defining the term 'properly constituted' in Anicle 66, which the commentary 
treats as identical to 'regularly constituted') .... " 126 S. Ct. at 2796--97. Henceforth, U.S. 
constitutional lawyers will need to keep abreast of the "relevant," but "not binding" 
commentaries to the Geneva Conventions and other ICRC publications-all postdating 
the negotiation and entry into force of the Conventions themselves. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. 
at 2790 n.48. 
31. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2797. 
32. /d. at 2798 (plurality opinion). 
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Justice Kennedy also penned a separate concurrence. In ad-
dition to choosing somewhat narrower language to indicate 
where he agreed with Justice Stevens' opinion, he also made 
clear that, especially in light of military commission regulations 
requiring a "full and fair trial," he would not decide at this point 
in the proceedings whether the UCMJ or Common Article 3 
"necessarily requires that the accused have the right to be pre-
sent at all stages of a criminal trial. "33 
It should also be clear that because Justice Kennedy parted 
ways, there was no majority for the view that the charge against 
Hamdan failed to state an offense against the laws of war; that 
the accused has a nearly absolute right to be present at all stages 
of the military commission proceedings; or that certain provi-
sions of the Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, which have 
not been ratified by the United States/4 were applicable to 
Hamdan's trial. 
Even where the Justices spoke as a Court, there are signifi-
cant limits to the Court's ruling that should inform Congres-
sional deliberations over which procedures should govern any 
military commissions for the Guantanamo detainees. 
First, Hamdan says nothing about the President's authority 
to detain the Guantanamo detainees or other alleged unlawful 
combatants for the duration of hostilities, even without bringing 
formal charges against them. Justice Stevens's opinion states that 
it assumes, at least for purposes of its decision, that Hamdan is a 
dangerous individual who would act on his beliefs if given the 
opportunity, and does not address "the Government's power to 
detain him for the duration of active hostilities in order to pre-
vent such harm. "35 
Second, the overarching theme of the Court's decision is 
that, at least under existing UCMJ legislation, the Government 
must show military necessity for departing from court-martial 
33. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2799,2809 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
34. The Reagan Administration refused to submit Protocol I to the Senate in part 
because of provisions that "would grant combatant status to irregular forces even if they 
do not satisfy the traditional requirements to distinguish themselves from the civilian 
population and otherwise comply with the laws of war." S. Treaty Doc. 100-2, 100'' 
Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1987). It is unclear whether other provisions of the Protocol are ac-
ceptable to, and presumably binding on, the United States as merely reflecting customary 
international law. The plurality in Hamdan relied on an article by William H. Taft, IV, 
then Legal Adviser to the State Department, for its assertion that Article 75 of Protocol I 
is entitled to such status. See Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2797 (quoting Taft, The Law of 
Armed Conflicc A jeer 9111: Some Saliem Feacures, 28 YALE J. INT'L L. 319, 322 (2003)). 
35. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2798. 
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procedures. The Court would appear to be suggesting that the 
use of military commissions in occupied territory or in the thea-
ter of conflid6 might trigger judicial abstention from interfer-
ence with ongoing commission proceedings37 and might warrant 
different procedures from those commonly afforded in courts-
martial.38 
Third, Hamdan is not a constitutional ruling, but rather a 
decision about the presence vel non of Congressional authoriza-
tion and the content of any legislated limits on the President's 
use of military commissions. Justice Breyer separately con-
curred, in an opinion joined by Justices Kennedy, Souter and 
Ginsburg, to emphasize that while "Congress has denied the 
President the legislative authority to create military commissions 
of the kind at issue here ... [n]othing prevents the President 
from returning to Congress to seek the authority he believes 
necessary. "39 
Indeed, as a formal matter, Hamdan does not necessarily 
require further Congressional authorization. Although we think 
the President was well advised, as a political matter, to seek such 
authorization, it is possible to read the Court's opinion as predi-
36. The Court's opinion identified three different contexts in which military com-
missions have been used: (1) "they have substituted for civilian courts at times and in 
places where martial law has been declared"; (2) they "have been established to try civil-
ians as part of a temporary military government over occupied enemy territory or terri-
tory regained from an enemy where civilian government cannot and does not function"; 
and (3) they have been "convened as 'incident to the conduct of war' when there is a 
need 'to seize and subject to disciplinary measures those enemies who in their attempt to 
thwart or impede our military effort have violated the law of war."' !d. at 2775-76 (quot-
ing Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304, 314 (1946), and Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 
28-29 (1942)). The third type of military commission, "the law-of-war military commis-
sion," Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2776, is the one that was at issue in the case: "Since Guan-
tanamo Bay is neither enemy-occupied territory nor under martial law, the law-of-war 
commission is the only model available" to the Government. !d. at 2777. In finding the 
charges against Hamdan insufficient, the Court observed: "The charge's shortcomings 
arc not merely formal, but indicative of a broader inability on the Executive's part here 
to satisfy the most basic precondition-at least in the absence of specific congressional 
authorization-for establishment of military commissions-military necessity. Hamdan's 
tribunal was appointed not by a military commander in the field of battle, but by a re-
tired major general stationed away from any active hostilities." !d. at 2785. 
37. The Court stated that "we certainly do not foreclose the possibility that absten-
tion may be appropriate in some cases seeking review of ongoing military commission 
proceedings (such as military commissions convened on the battlefield) .... " Id. at 2772. 
38. The uniformity principle that the Court derived from Article 36 of the UCMJ is 
cabined by the concept of impracticablity: "The uniformity principle is not an inllexible 
one; it does not preclude all departures from the procedures dictated for use by courts-
martial. But any departure must be tailored to the exigency that necessitates it." Id. at 
2790. However, the Court notes, "[n]othing in the record before us demonstrates that it 
would be impracticable to apply court-martial rules in this case." !d. at 2792. 
39. !d. at2799 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
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cated on the absence of a requisite Presidential finding under 
Article 36 of the UCMJ. The Court states in Part VI-C of its 
opm10n: 
... Without reaching the question whether any provision of 
Commission Order No. 1 is strictly "contrary to or inconsis-
tent with" other provisions of the UCMJ, we conclude that 
the "practicability" determination the President has made is 
insufficient to justify variances from the procedures governing 
courts-martial. .... 
The President here has determined, pursuant to subsection 
(a) [of Article 36], that it is impracticable to apply the rules 
and principles of law that govern "the trial of criminal cases in 
the United States district courts," §836(a), to Hamdan's 
commission. We assume that complete deference is owed to 
that determination. The President has not, however, made a 
similar official determination that it is impracticable to apply 
the rules for courts-martial. 40 
The Court, however, went on to suggest that the record 
would not support a Presidential determination of impracticabil-
ity. It is a bit difficult to understand, however, how the Court 
could have done anything more than offer preliminary but non-
binding views, without awaiting an initial President determina-
tion as to which of the court-martial procedures would be im-
practicable in the al Qaeda cases and why. There is a rule in ad-
ministrative law, called the Chenery doctrine, requiring that 
administrative action be judged on an agency's stated reasons. 
But if these reasons are found to be inadequate as a legal matter, 
the court must remand the case back to the agency for a reex-
amination (unless there is only one outcome that is legally sus-
tainable ).41 This doctrine, which reflects respect for the actions of 
politically accountable branches, would seem at least equally 
applicable to the President, and would argue for treating the 
Court's discussion of the quality of the procedures anticipated 
for Hamdan's military commission as dicta. It may serve as guid-
ance to the President and Congress but it is not a holding that is 
40. !d. at 2791 (emphasis added). Admittedly, the President's November 13 Order 
omits an express determination under Article 36(b) while providing one under Article 
36(a). Read in a less-crabbed manner, however, the Order would seem to reflect ade-
quately an executive determination that the stated military exigency required the con-
templated departure from procedures normally governing court-martialprocedures, in-
cluding special provisions for the admission of evidence and the handling of classified 
information. See November 13 Order, supra note 2, at§ 4(c)(3)-(4). 
41. See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80 (1943). 
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binding on either branch or the Court in a later case squarely 
addressing the adequacy of procedures actually adopted by a 
military commission. 
Fourth, Hamdan does not hold, as some have suggested, 
that Common Article 3 is treaty law that may be directly in-
voked during private litigation. The Supreme Court's 1950 deci-
sion in Johnson v. Eisentrager 42 rejected the view that the Ge-
neva Convention of 192943 was judicially enforceable.44 As Justice 
Jackson wrote, a few years after his service as chief prosecutor 
for the United States in the Nuremberg trials: "It is ... the obvi-
ous scheme of the [Geneva] Agreement that responsibility for 
observance and enforcement of these rights is upon political and 
military authorities. Rights of alien enemies are vindicated under 
it only through protests and interventions of protecting pow-
ers .... 
,45 
Hamdan is a construction of the UCMJ, not a direct appli-
cation of the Geneva Conventions of 1949. The Court neither 
purports to overturn Eisentrager nor suggests that the Geneva 
Conventions of 1949 are entitled to a different status than their 
1929 predecessor.46 Rather, the Court reasons, even if Hamdan 
cannot invoke the Conventions as an "independent source of law 
binding upon the Government's actions," the protections of the 
Conventions are "part of the law of war" and "compliance with 
the law of war is the condition upon which the authority set forth 
in Article 21 [of the UCMJ] is granted."47 Article 21 is the provi-
42. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950). 
43. Geneva Convention of July 27, 1929,47 Stat. 2021. 
44. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950). 
45. !d. at 789 n.l4. 
46. The Hamdan Court noted: "We may assume that 'the obvious scheme' of the 
1949 Conventions is identical in all relevant respects to that of the 1929 Convention, and 
even that that scheme would, absent some other provision of law, preclude Hamdan's 
invocation of the Convention's provisions as an independent source of law binding upon 
the Government's actions and furnishing petitioner with any enforceable right." 126 S. 
Ct. at 2794. 
47. /d. It is not clear, however, why a similar argument could not have been made in 
Eisentrager, since the text of Article 21 of the UCMJ, on which the Hamdan Court relied, 
is virtually identical to Article 15 of the Articles of War ("A W"), which were enacted 
during World War I, see Act of Aug. 29, 1916, ch. 418, § 3, 39 Stat. 650, and presumably 
would have applied in Eisentrager. The apparent purpose of Article 15 was to preserve 
the preexisting jurisdiction of military commissions despite the enlargement of the con-
current jurisdiction of courts-martial over violations of the law of war. See Madsen v. 
Kinsella, 343 U.S. 341, 353-54 (1952). When Congress enacted Article 21 of the UMCJ in 
1950, 64 Stat. 115, 145, it merely codified Article 15 without intending any change. See S. 
Rep. No. 486, 81st Cong., 1" Sess. 13 (1949) ("This article preserves existing Army and 
Air Force law which gives concurrent jurisdiction to military tribunals other than courts-
martial. The language of A W 15 has been preserved because it has been construed by the 
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sian granting courts-martial concurrent jurisdiction over "of-
fenders or offenses that by statute or by the law of war may be 
tried by military commissions, provost courts, or other military 
tribunals." 
The significance of this point is that Congress may enjoy 
considerable latitude in revisiting the applicable provisions of 
the UCMJ to make a more discerning incorporation of treaty-
based obligations than was apparently the case in Hamdan. For 
example, Congress might provide its own interpretation of 
Common Article 3's requirement of a "regularly constituted" 
tribunal, perhaps more in keeping with the discernible intent of 
the contracting parties in 1949 to bar only '"summary' justice"48 
rather than adopting all of the court-martial procedures used to 
try ordinary criminal offenses committed by armed forces per-
sonnel. Indeed, as we shall see below, this is exactly what Con-
gress has done. Justice Kennedy's separate concurrence provides 
further support for this conclusion by tying the requirements of 
Article 3 to both the absence of specific Congressional authori-
zation and a Presidential showing of "some practical need" to 
dispense with court-martial procedures.49 
Our final point about Hamdan goes to the procedures that 
the decision requires be followed in any military commissions 
used for al Qaeda suspects. Here, too, there has been a tendency 
among commentators to overstate the reach of the Court's deci-
sion. Professor Michael Scharf, for example, testified in July 
Supreme Court" (citing Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 29 (1942)); see also H.R. Rep. No. 
491, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1949) (same). 
48. "Sentences and executions without previous trial are by definition open to er-
ror. 'Summary justice' may be effective on account of the fear it arouses, but it adds too 
many innocent victims to all of the other innocent victims of the conflict. All civilized 
nations surround the administration of justice with safeguards aimed at eliminating the 
possibility of judicial errors. The Convention has rightly proclaimed that it is essential to 
do this even in time of war. We must be very clear about one point; it is only 'summary' 
justice which it is intended to prohibit." ICRC, Commentary, III Geneva Convention 
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War 3940 (JeanS. Pictet ed. 1960) (emphasis 
added). As Professor Kenneth Anderson of American University's Washington College 
of Law notes on his blog: This passage in Common Article 3 "was, after all, about pre-
venting summary execution. No one ever imagined it to be about giving detainees in civil 
wars all the protections of a regular court-if for no other reason than that its terms apply 
to both government forces and insurgent forces." Posting of Professor Kenneth Anderson, 
http:l/kennethandersonlawofwar.blogspot.com/2006/07//hamdan-geneva-conventions-and-c 
(July 17, 2006) (emphasis in original). 
49. "At a minimum a military commission like the one at issue-a commission spe-
cifically convened by the President to try specific persons without express congressional 
authorization -can be 'regularly constituted' by the standards of our military justice sys-
tem only if some practical need explains deviations from court-martial practice." Ham-
dan, 126 S. Ct. at 2804 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
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2006 before House Armed Services Committee that the Court 
held that the Guantanamo detainee commissions violated "re-
quired international rules of due process" by: 
• Authorizing the exclusion of the defendant from his own 
trial (whenever the government invokes "national secu-
rity concerns" whether the particular evidence is classi-
fied or not). 
• Permitting the admission of unreliable evidence (such as 
hearsay and evidence gained through coercion). 
• Permitting witnesses to testify without disclosing their 
identities to the defendant (in order to protect intelli-
gence sources and methods). 
• Establishing review procedures that do not amount to an 
appeal to an independent higher court.50 
None of these assertions, in our view, is a plausible account 
of the Court's holding. As we have suggested, the Court essen-
tially remanded to Congress the question of authorization for 
the military commissions and the procedures they should follow. 
The Court's criticism of the procedures outlined in the Presi-
dent's order should be read in light of the fact that it was en-
gaged in a statutory construction of the UCMJ, which Congress 
and perhaps even the President on a showing of military neces-
sity or "some practical need," to quote Justice Kennedy, could 
alter. 
Even on the Court's own terms, however, these "required 
international rules of due process" cannot be advanced as part of 
the Court's holding. As to the first and third of these rules, Jus-
tice Kennedy withheld his vote from Part VI-D-iv of the plural-
ity opinion to leave open the question of the circumstances un-
der which Hamdan or other detainees could be excluded from 
proceedings to protect sensitive information or confidential 
sources. Justice Kennedy is quite explicit in saying that he would 
not rely at all on Article 75 of Protocol I to the Geneva Conven-
tions (given the Government's decision in the 1980s not to ac-
cede to the protocol) or decide whether Common Article 3 "re-
quires that the accused have the right to be present at all stages 
of a criminal trial. "51 While Justice Kennedy considered "the 
50. House Armed Services Comm., Hearing on Standards of Military Commissions 
and Tribunals, Prepared Statement of Michael P. Scharf, Professor of Law and Director, 
Frederick K. Cox International Law Center, Case Western Reserve University School of 
Law (July 26, 2006), p. 3 (on file with authors). 
51. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2809. 
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possibility of a conviction and sentence" based on evidence not 
seen or heard by the accused to be "troubling," he pointed out 
that both the military order's overall requirement of a "full and 
fair trial" and the availability of judicial review under the DT A 
justified refraining from ruling on this issue at this juncture.52 
The second "rule" barring "unreliable evidence" seems be-
side the point because the President's order did not authorize 
use of unreliable evidence; instead, it provided for "admission of 
such evidence as would ... have probative value to a reasonable 
person." 53 As for "evidence gained through coercion," the com-
mission regulations provided for exclusion of declarations "es-
tablished to have been made as a result of torture .... "54 More-
over, the DT A expressly bars "cruel, inhuman, or degrading 
treatment or punishment" of persons in U.S. custody, and re-
quires assessment by the Defense Department and a report to 
Congress as to whether any determination regarding a detainee 
used evidence that "was obtained as a result of coercion" and 
"the probative value (if any) of any such statement."55 
As for Scharf's third proposed "rule," requiring identifica-
tion of testifying witnesses, this matter was not decided by the 
Court. Justice Kennedy observed that military rules of evidence 
already regulate "use of classified information," and that the 
commission regulations already "bar the presiding officer from 
admitting secret evidence if doing so would deprive the accused 
of a 'full and fair trial.' This fairness determination, moreover, is 
unambiguously subject to judicial review under the DTA."56 
With regards to the fourth "rule," since the DTA expressly 
provides for review by the D.C. Circuit of both classification de-
terminations and final decisions of military commissions, it is a 
bit difficult to understand how the Court could have had before 
it the issue of whether the review procedures afforded the Guan-
tanamo detainees did or did not "amount to an appeal to an in-
dependent higher court." In any event, the Court did not purport 
to pass on this question. 
52. Id. ("The evidentiary proceedings at Hamdan's trial have yet to commence, and 
it remains to be seen whether he will suffer any prejudicial exclusion."). 
53. See November 13 Order, supra note 2, § 4(c)(3). 
54. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2808 (citing Military Commission Instruction No. 10, § 
3(A) (Mar. 24, 2006)). 
55. Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, H.R. 2863, 109th Cong. §§ 1003, 1005(b) 
(2005). 
56. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2809. 
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Hamdan is an extremely important decision, and the Jus-
tices faced a difficult task of assessing the imperatives of national 
security in terms of existing statutory restrictions on the use of 
military tribunals. It is important, however, to distinguish be-
tween what the Hamdan Court held, and what it suggested in 
dicta or in a simple plurality opinion. The former, of course, is 
binding precedent. The latter, however, represents a discussion 
that may indeed have influence over Congress, the President, 
and the courts, but only to the extent the Court's reasoning has 
the power to persuade. 
II. THE MILITARY COMMISSIONS ACT OF 2006 
Taking up the Court's invitation in Hamdan, Congress en-
acted the Military Commissions Act of 2006 ("MCA" or "Act"), 
which President Bush signed into law on October 17, 2006. Con-
gress plainly supplied the specific authorization to try Guan-
tanamo detainees by military commission that the Hamdan 
Court found lacking. The legislation states that an "alien unlaw-
ful enemy combatant," which includes "a person who has en-
gaged in hostilities or who has purposefully and materially sup-
ported hostilities against the United States or its co-belligerents 
who is not a lawful enemy combatant (including a person who is 
part of the Taliban, al Qaeda, or associated forces)," is subject to 
trial by military commission for any offense made punishable by 
the MCA or the law of war committed after September 11, 
2001.57 A military commission established under the MCA is ex-
pressly deemed "a regularly constituted court" for purposes of 
Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949.08 Under 
the Act, military commissions are separated from the UCMJ, as 
the procedures for trial by general courts-martial do not "apply 
to trial by mi~itary commission except as specifically provided in 
this chapter."09 Moreover, "judicial construction and application" 
of the UCMJ "are not binding on military commissions estab-
lished under this chapter."60 Similarly, any rulings by a military 
commission "may not be introduced or considered" or "form the 
basis of any holding, decision, or other determination" in any 
court-martial proceedings. 61 
57. Military Commissions Act of 2006, 10 U .S.C §§ 948a(l), 948d(a) (2006). 
58. !d. § 948b(f). 
59. !d.§ 948b(c). 
60. !d. 
61. !d.§ 948b(e). 
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The MCA rejects the Hamdan ruling in other respects as 
well. First, disavowing the plurality's position, Congress in the 
MCA declared that a conspiracy "to commit one or more of the 
substantive offenses triable by military commission under this 
chapter," including one "who knowingly does any overt act to 
effect the object of the conspiracy," constitutes a punishable of-
fense.62 Second, restoring the law to where it had been under 
Eisentrager, the MCA provides that "[n]o alien unlawful enemy 
combatant subject to trial by military commission under this 
chapter may invoke the Geneva Conventions as a source of 
rights."63 Third, the MCA expressly allows use of hearsay evi-
dence not admissible in trial by general courts-martial if the pro-
ponent of the evidence makes known to the adverse party "suffi-
ciently in advance to provide the adverse party with a fair 
opportunity to meet the evidence, the intention of the proponent 
to offer the evidence, and the particulars of the evidence (includ-
ing information on the general circumstances under which the 
evidence was obtained)."64 The adverse party can attempt to 
have the hearsay evidence excluded by demonstrating that the 
evidence "is unreliable or lacking in probative value. "65 
On two procedural points, the legislation essentially adopts 
the Hamdan Court's view. First, the accused and his counsel are 
given the right to have all commission proceedings conducted in 
their presence and made part of the record, except where the 
commission is deliberating or voting or the accused after warn-
ing persists in conduct disrupting the proceedings.66 Second, the 
accused and his counsel are permitted to hear and confront clas-
sified information, although the military judge is required to take 
certain steps to protect confidential information the disclosure of 
which "would be detrimental to the national security."67 The 
military judge is authorized to delete specified items of classified 
information, substitute a summary for such classified informa-
tion, or substitute a statement of relevant facts that the classified 
information would tend to prove.68 The Secretary of Defense is 
given the authority to prescribe additional regulations for the 
use and protection of classified information that are "consistent 
with" these provisions of the MCA. 
62. I d. § 950v(b )(28). 
63. !d. § 948b(g). 
64. !d. § 949a(b )(2)(E). 
65. Id. 
66. Id. §§ 949a(b)(B), 949d(b),(c) & (e). 
67. !d.§§ 949a(b)(A), 949d(f). 
68. Id. § 949d(f)(2)-(3). 
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On the whole, the MCA provides a set of substantial safe-
guards for the trial of detainees considered to be alien unlawful 
enemy combatants who have committed punishable offenses or 
violations of the law of war. These include (1) advance notice to 
the accused of the charges against him;69 (2) a prohibition of 
compulsory self-incrimination;70 (3) an absolute exclusion of 
statements obtained by use of torture and qualified protection 
against use of statements obtained by coercion;7' ( 4) a guarantee 
of institutional independence for military commissions by bar-
ring any discipline or adverse consideration of members of the 
commissions for any determinations or other acts performed in 
course of commission proceedings;72 (5) a right on the part of the 
accused to be represented by civilian counsel in addition to de-
tailed military counsel;73 (6) a requirement that all commission 
proceedings be held in the presence of the accused and his coun-
sel and be made part of the record;74 (7) proceedings held in pub-
lic unless closed on a specific finding by the military judge that 
such closure is necessary to prevent disclosure harmful to na-
tional security or risk to the physical safety of individuals;75 (8) 
guarantees against double jeopardy, including a bar to any ap-
pellate correction of a not-guilty determination;76 (9) provision of 
a defense of lack of mental responsibility sufficient "to apweci-
ate the nature and quality of the wrongfulness of the acts"; (10) 
required instructions that the accused "must be presumed inno-
cent until his guilt is established by legal and competent counsel 
beyond a reasonable doubt" and that "the burden of proof to es-
tablish the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt is 
upon the United States";78 (11) the opportunity for post-trial re-
view of findings of guilty and the accompanying sentence by the 
convening authority and a newly-established Court of Military 
Commission Review;79 and (12) judicial review of final judg-
ments of military commissions on "matters of law" by the U.S. 
69. !d. § 948q(b ). 
70. !d.§ 948r(a). 
71. !d. § 948r(b )-(d). 
72. /d. § 949b. 
73. !d.§ 949c(b)(3). 
74. Id. §§ 949a(b)(B), 949d(b). 
75. /d. § 949d( d). 
76. ld. §§ 949h, 950a, 950b(c)(2)(C) & (d)(2)(B), 950d(a)(2), 950e(b), 950g(a)(2). 
77. Id. § 949k(a). 
78. !d.§ 949I(c)(1),(4). 
79. Id. §§ 950b-950g. 
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Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit and, on writ of certiorari, 
by the Supreme Court.80 
There are, however, certain aspects of the new legislation 
that give us pause. The definition of "alien unlawful enemy 
combatant" is written so broadly as possibly to include even in-
dividuals apprehended within the United States even when they 
engage in no punishable conduct while here.81 If so, we question 
why it is always appropriate to have such individuals tried by 
military commission rather than in the courts. We are also trou-
bled by the failure of the Act to deal with the problem of indefi-
nite detention of individuals who are not forwarded to a Com-
batant Status Review Tribunal, or another competent tribunal 
established by the President. We appreciate the fact that the 
Administration conducts an ongoing review of the status of the 
Guantanamo detainees-in 2005, 460 detainees cases were re-
viewed and fourteen detainees were declared eli~ible for release 
as no longer believed to pose a significant threat. 2 While this re-
cord indicates the Government's willingness to correct mistakes, 
it also suggests that mistakes have been made. 
As we write, these and other important questions are in liti-
gation. On February 20, 2007, a divided panel of the D.C. Cir-
cuit upheld the constitutionality of the MCA's restriction on ha-
beas review.83 Almost immediately, a petition for a writ of 
certiorari was filed in the Supreme Court, presenting two ques-
tions; first, whether the MCA validly stripped federal court ju-
risdiction over habeas corpus petitions filed by foreign citizens 
imprisoned indefinitely at Guantanamo Bay; and second, 
whether the petitioner's five-year detention demonstrates unlaw-
ful confinement requiring the grant of habeas relief or, at the 
least, a hearing on the merits. In addition, attorneys for the peti-
tioners have filed a motion to expedite the Court's consideration 
of the petition.84 As for Salim Hamdan, the D.C. Circuit re-
manded his case to the district court, where Hamdan filed a brief 
challenging the constitutionality of the MCA. The Government 
responded with a brief arguing that the district court lacks juris-
diction over Hamdan's petition for writ of habeas corpus. On 
80. !d. § 950g. 
81. There is no express geographic limitation to the definition of "unlawful enemy 
combatant" in the Military Commissions Act of 2006, 10 U.S.C. § 948a(1) (2006). 
82. Department of Defense, Administrative Review Board Summary, 2006 (avail-
able at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jan2006/d20060130arb.pdf). 
83. Boumediene v. Bush, eta/., 476 F.3d 981 (D.C. Cir. 2007), petition for cert. filed, 
(Mar. 5, 2007) (No. 06-1195). 
84. See Petition For Writ of Certiorari, Boumediene v. Bush, et al.,No. 06-1195. 
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December 13 2006, the District Court held that the MCA re-
quired dismissal of Hamdan's petition.85 The United States' brief 
also takes the position that the MCA does not violate the Sus-
pension Clause because aliens abroad have no constitutional 
rights. Although we express no view on the merits of that claim, 
or the merits of Hamdan's constitutional attack upon the MCA, 
we are confident that at least some of the questions and concerns 
raised in this article will be addressed by the two courts. We are 
also confident, however, that the legal debate over the treatment 
of enemy combatants will not end there. 
* * * 
Many academic commentators argued that the Court's in-
tervention in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld was salutary as it required 
Congress to play an explicit role in shaping the structure and 
procedures governing the use of military commissions to try the 
Guantanamo detainees. As Justice Breyer noted in his concur-
ring opinion, "[ n]othing prevents the President from returning to 
Congress to seek the authority he believes necessary."86 The 
President did return to Congress, and it has now acted, providing 
a resolution in response to the Court's holding but one that may 
not be entirely welcome to Hamdan's enthusiasts. 
85. Hamdan v. Runsfeld, Civ. A. No. 04-1518 (D.D.C.). 
86. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2799 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
